It was the big headline in a market report that gold
forward rates (GOFO) were negative for the first time since the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in 2008. While this information is correct, it should suggest
that this marks again a turning point for the price of gold. While Lehman
Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, it was only 44 days later that
gold reached its low at 680$/oz and started the rise to the new all-time high
at 1920$/oz on September 6, 2011. However,
the 1month gold forward rate turned negative only in November 2007. The
sequence of events is similar this year. Gold reached a new low in late June
and then recovered before GOFO rates turned negative. But the similarities end
here.
Negative GOFO rates imply that spot gold with delivery
after 2 business days is trading higher than the price for gold fixed today for
delivery in 1, 2, 3 or 6 months. The 1 year gold forward rate remained positive
last week. Thus, the gold market turned from contango (the normal state in this
market) into backwardation, which is unusual for the precious metals. In other
commodity markets, backwardation is often explained by the concept of
convenience yield. However, this concept does not apply for gold and silver as
there is an active market for lending these two precious metals. Moreover, gold
forward rates can not form freely in the market. They are bound by money market
interest rates and the lease rates in the market for lending gold. Arbitrage
could set in, if the following identity equation is violated:
Gold forward
rate = money market rate – gold lease rate.
The money market rate is normally the US dollar LIBOR
for the corresponding duration of the gold forward.
This identity equation also helps to explain why the
gold forward rate turns negative. Either the LIBOR rate has to fall or the gold
lease rate has to increase or there is a combination of both factors.
In 2008, immediately with the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, the 1mth gold forward rate increased as the LIBOR rate, which
includes bank risk, rose stronger than the gold lease rate. However, already at
the end of September, the forward rate reached its peak and turned around. This
was triggered by a jump in the gold lease rate. But from the middle of October,
both rates fell. Due to the Fed policy, the LIBOR rate fell stronger than the
gold lease rate, which remained above 1.25%. The 1mth LIBOR was briefly below
the gold lease rate in November 2008, which caused the negative gold forward
rate.
However, in 2013, the 1mth LIBOR rate showed a
downward bias, but the overall range was just less than 2 basis points. This is
not enough to explain the negative gold forward rate of -0.11% on Wednesday.
Thus, unlike in 2008, the movement of the gold lease rates was the responsible
factor for the backwardation in the gold market.
The crucial question is thus, which factors drive the gold lease rate. Our quantitative research identified two factors, which explain around 85% of the movements of the 1mth gold lease rate since January 2012, the price of gold and the gold inventories in CME warehouses. The chart above shows the weekly gold lease rate and the spot gold price. It is obvious that the gold lease rate also started to increase when gold resumed its downward move leading to the low in late June. Hedge funds not only sold physical gold they held via ETFs but also sold gold short in the physical market. As those deals usually have to be settled after 2 business days, the hedge funds have to lend the gold from institutional holders. This demand already led to a steady increase of the lease rate.
The next chart shows the development of the gold
stocks held in CME warehouses together with the gold lease rate and the model
estimate of the lease rate. As long as the inventories are abandoned, hedge
funds being short physical gold don’t have to worry about covering their
shorts. They could meet the obligation to return the gold lend by buying in the
spot market or by purchasing futures with expiration before they have to make
delivery. Then, they can take physical delivery from the long future and meet
their obligation to return the gold back to the lender. However, if inventories
fall rapidly, the risk increases for the borrower to obtain gold right in time
by purchasing a gold future and take delivery. But also the risk for the lender
increases that the gold will be returned at the agreed date. Thus, lenders get
hesitant to enter new lease agreements and/or demand higher risk premiums for
lending gold.
After the speech of Fed chairman Bernanke last
Wednesday, following the release of the FOMC minutes, the gold lease rates came
down. As an immediate tapering of the bond purchasing program got less likely,
also the short speculation against gold declined, which contributed to the
decline of the lease rates. The US dollar weakened against the major currencies
and also the bond markets recovered. However, it remains only a question of
timing that the Fed will reduce the volume of being bonds. Thus, the
medium-term outlook for a firmer US dollar against the major currency remains
intact. Therefore, the upside potential for gold appears to be limited and the
negative gold lease rate is in no way a harbinger for a rally in the gold
market like after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. On the other hand, as long
as gold inventories held in CME warehouses decline, the risk for selling gold
short increases. This might limit also the downside risk for the gold price.
However, all in all, the risk for gold appears to be more biased to the
downside despite the recovery last week.
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