Just a few
weeks ago, when some emerging market currencies came under renewed strong
pressure and the central bank of Argentina suspended to intervene in the
foreign exchange market and the central banks of India and Turkey hiked their
key interest rates, many commentators compared the situation with the Asian
currency crisis in the late 1990th. However, in-between, the
situation has calmed down a bit and the US stock market posted the first week
with a gain in this year. From our point of view, the situation is not
comparable to the Asian crisis.
There are
several indicators, which could lead to a currency crisis, especially when a
country has a fixed exchange rate regime. The first factor is increasing indebtedness in foreign
currencies. Often, the interest rate level in an emerging market country is
higher than the one in a country, whose currency is regarded as a reserve
currency. Thus, it is not surprising, that borrowers try to take advantage of
the interest rate spread between two currencies. The amount of outstanding
borrowing in foreign currencies increases. Sooner or later, foreign exchange
analysts regard the level of foreign debt as unsustainable and write reports
with the recommendation to sell this currency. As traders and investors follow
those recommendations, the currency weakens and the cost of servicing the debt
in a foreign currency increases. These costs are then regarded as unsustainable
in foreign exchange markets and the pressure on the currency intensifies.
However,
statistics about the debt in a foreign country only state the amount of debt
but not whether this debt is hedged against currency fluctuations or fully
exposed to the exchange rate risk. Private entities as well as governments
could enter swap agreements that transfer the foreign currency loan into one
denominated in the domestic currency. The disadvantage of those swaps is the
reduction in the borrowing costs is given up to a large extend.
Some central
governments from emerging market countries, like for example Turkey, are
frequent borrowers in international bond markets. If not explicitly ruled out
by law, those governments could reduce the foreign exchange rate risk without
sacrificing a large part of the interest rate advantage of borrowing in a
foreign currency. They could enter an agreement with the central bank to sell
the proceeds from the bond to the central bank for obtaining the corresponding
amount in local currency and at the same time agree to reverse this transaction
when the bond is due. The central bank would have an increase in foreign
reserves and could invest this increase in a bond which expires shortly before
the bond of the central government is due. Thus, the central bank would have
the necessary liquidity back when the reverse currency swap with the government
would be due. In addition, the central bank could earn interest on the bond in
foreign currency. As the profit of central banks is usually distributed to the
central government, the foreign exchange rate risk would be widely reduced. By
and large, only the spread between the interest rate paid by the government on
its bond and the interest rate earned by the central bank would be exposed to
the risk of exchange rate fluctuations.
Such a
transaction would not only reduce the exchange rate risk for the central
government, but would also sterilize the impact of government borrowing on the
current account. The rise in capital imports is neutralized by the increase of
foreign reserves. However, the central bank extends its balance sheet. But also
this effect could be sterilized by withdrawing liquidity from the banking
sector.
Another indicator
often quoted is the rise of capital
imports. An increase of capital imports is viewed as a growing dependence
on foreign capital inflows. Furthermore, it is argued that those capital
imports would increase the debt of the private and government sector in foreign
currencies, and thus, would intensify the risk of an unsustainable debt level
if the currency depreciates. This could indeed be the case. However, also in
this case, a more in-depth analysis is required for avoiding the wrong
conclusions. Capital imports are not necessarily the result that a country
would have to obtain funds in a foreign currency to finance its imports. The
rise of capital imports could also be the result of foreign investors, seeking
higher returns, increase their investments in assets of an emerging market
country. Investments in equity markets or bonds issued at the domestic primary
market are normally denominated in the local currency. In this case, the
investor would have to bear the foreign exchange rate risk. The higher capital
imports in this scenario do not alter the level of indebtedness in other
currencies, and thus, they do not change the risk that exchange rate
fluctuations could lead to a default of private or public debtors.
The third
indicator for the risk of a currency crisis is the development of the current account. A rising deficit in the current
account is regarded as unsustainable if a certain ratio of current account
deficit to GDP is exceeded. However, a closer analysis of the factors driving
the higher deficit is also needed for this indicator. If, as it is often the
case, the widening current account deficit is due to an increased demand for
foreign goods and services by the emerging market economy, then this indicator
could rightly point to an increased risk of a currency crisis. But if the
original impulse comes from foreign investors purchasing more assets of an
emerging market economy, then the situation is different. Even if the central
bank tries to neutralize the impact of higher capital imports induced by the
demand of foreign investors, it normally cannot fully sterilize the impact of
foreign investors on the balance of payment. Thus, if capital transactions
induced by foreign investors are the main reason that the capital account shows
an increased net-import balance, then the current account has to be in a
deficit. This is an underlying condition of balance of payment accounting.
The
Economist published an interesting chart some weeks ago, which displayed the
cumulative purchases of bonds and equities of emerging market economies by
institutional investors. The striking point was, that the cumulative purchases
started to increase already at the beginning of the new millennium, thus, about
one decade before the Fed implemented quantitative easing. The glut of capital flows
from two Asian countries with huge current account surpluses into Western
capital markets depressed the return on government bonds, especially on US
Treasury notes and German Bunds. However, also the spreads of other Eurozone member
countries over the benchmark bunds fell considerably. Thus, institutional
investors sought to achieve higher returns to meet expectations of funds
sponsors by investing in emerging markets.
The
financial crisis only shortly led to a decline of the cumulative investments in
emerging market equities and bonds. For bonds, they almost fell back to zero.
However, already in 2009, the cumulative investments reversed direction again
and increased strongly due to the massive stimulus measures taken by China. The
quantitative easing measures of the Fed supported this move, but were not the
trigger. Therefore, the rise of capital imports by emerging market economies
was induced by the decision of investors to allocate more funds for the
purchase of emerging market stocks and bonds. By mid-2013 the level of
cumulative investments in emerging market stocks as well as in bonds exceeded
the pre-financial crisis amount by far. As lined out above, those investors
also had to bear the risk of exchange rate fluctuations.
As former
Fed chairman Bernanke announced in May at a Congress testimony that the FOMC
might decide to taper at one of the next few meetings, institutional investors
and fx-traders came to the conclusion that less money would flow into emerging
market assets. In addition, rising yields on US Treasury paper had to be
expected and the yield on the benchmark 10yr US T-Note indeed rose to 3%. Thus,
also the relative advantage of domestic emerging market bonds changed. In this
altered environment, institutional investors had to adjust their asset
allocations. As a result, they reduced exposure to emerging markets, which
already led to currency weakness in the summer of 2013. With the start of
tapering in January, another wave of currency weakness set in.
However, as it were institutional investors,
which increased their exposure to emerging markets, they were also the driving
force behind the rise of capital imports and current account deficits by
emerging market countries. They invested in assets denominated in local
currencies of the various emerging market economies. The repatriation of funds could
have a positive impact on the emerging market countries. With the devaluation
of their currencies, their products gain in international competitiveness. The
capital account should no longer be the driving force for the current account,
which should improve. Thus, the situation is different than it was in the late
1990th at the Asian currency crisis. That the situation has calmed
down might be due that more investors recognized the differences.